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Abstract 
This paper examines how motherhood, the use of childcare, and an individual’s geographic 
location affects their wages for a fifteen year period using cross-sectional data. Incorporating 
Gary Becker’s theory on the Gender Division of Labor (1985) and the feminist theory of the 
‘second shift’, the paper aims to better understand how wages are affected, and what factors 
contribute to that change. This paper also evaluates how an individual’s location, which highly 
corresponds to their ideological values, affects their wages. By utilizing the NLSY79, this 
analysis uses four empirical models, two Heckman Selection models to control for selection bias, 
a Two Stage Least Squares to control for reverse causality, and a Fixed Model to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. This research reveals that similar to past research, each additional 
child decrease wages by more than 10% and that paid childcare significantly increases women’s 
wages. Those who live in urban areas see a 4% to 10% increase in wages across, and those who 
live in the Northeastern US, which is much more urbanized than other areas of the US, earn more 
than those in other regions.  
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I. Introduction  
The gender wage gap is a real economic problem. Despite the fact that over the last several 
decades women have been entering the workforce in record high numbers and have made huge 
strides in educational attainment, women’s wages have stagnated (Council of Economic 
Advisors, 2014; BLS, 2016). Compared to men, women are paid less, more likely to hold low-
income jobs, and more likely to live in poverty. This not only hurts American women, but also 
American families. There is no sector of the economy, education level, or profession that does 
not have this gender wage disparity. A variety of reasons could explain this inequity, however 
current research has indicated that one of the largest reasons for wage inequality is motherhood 
(Fuchs, 1988).  
This paper will focus on the effect of the number of children and the use of childcare on a 
woman’s wages over a fifteen-year period of time. Even though it has become acceptable for 
women to step outside the rigid stereotype of the complacent housewife, they are still expected to 
be the primary caregiver for their children. Despite the popular rhetoric that encourages men to 
have a larger role in the household, women are still more likely to do the majority of cleaning, 
cooking, and child rearing than men. This has been termed by mainstream feminists as ‘the 
second shift,’ which may cause women to be less motivated and active in the workplace, thus 
reducing their ability to work at the same level as their male peers (Budig and England, 2001). 
This combined with subconscious prejudices against mothers, markets and employers have 
enacted ‘motherhood penalties’ that take the form of missed promotions or employment 
opportunities, low wages, or simple discrimination (Correll et al., 2007). Since it is also common 
for women to take leave following the birth of their child, which reduces their ability to gain 
experience and tenure in their careers, they have a smaller probability of a promotion or higher 
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wage. So when women re-enter the workforce, they are unable to achieve the same level of 
success as their male or childless peers.  
In comparison, working fathers are often paid more, even with similar credentials and 
experience. Though this inequality may seem to only affect women, it drags the entire American 
economy down: current research has found that if women were to achieve equal gender parity by 
2025, the US government could add 4.3 trillion dollars to the economy (Ellingrud et al., 2016). 
So it is beyond imperative that we figure out what is truly causing these low wages, and 
determine if there are any possible ways to alleviate it.  
 While there is an extensive amount of literature on the relationship between women’s 
wages and children, this paper will also differentiate from past literature by including a control 
for whether or not an individual has reliable childcare for their first child. Accessible childcare is 
common in a large portion of developed countries, including France and Sweden, and operate in 
a variety of ways, including vouchers, state provided care, or legislation requiring private 
companies to provide some sort of care themselves. Though countries with better childcare 
policies than the US still have a gender wage gap, wages have grown over the past three decades, 
while workers’ wages in the US have continued to stagnate (European Union, 2016). The model 
will also differentiate between the types of childcare, and the effect they have on women’s 
wages, specifically, the effect of paid childcare on women’s wages.  
 This paper will also differentiate from past literature by analyzing how the regional 
location of individuals in the US affects women’s wages. Any differentiation in wages could 
possibly be due to a variety of factors, including regional culture or ideology, where individuals 
may have conservative or liberal family beliefs, which could affect their careers and their 
children; regional policies, for example in the South, where there tends to be smaller 
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government, and thus less government assistance; or an indication of economic instability, where 
a particular region may have lower wages and less economic growth. Regional discrepancies in 
wages could indicate widespread gender inequity in the workplace, which would call for policy 
reform. However, it is important to note that not all individuals have the same beliefs as their 
peers, so using regional location does not necessarily dictate their personal beliefs. 
Figure 1: Percentage of Conservative Ideology by State 
 (Gallup, 2016) 
 This paper will evaluate four regions of the US: Northeast, North Central, South, and 
West. What states are included in these regions are located in Table 3 in the appendix. The 
Northeastern US is characterized by large cities, like New York City, Boston, and Philadelphia 
as well as liberal political views. The South tends to be more conservative, with their population 
spread farther out and traditional family values dictating societal norms. The North Central 
region is similar to the South, however they are much more agriculturally focused and they have 
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an even smaller population. The West is characterized by liberal political ideology, a diverse 
population, and a diverse job market (Desilver, 2014). 
 This paper will 
also analyze the urban or rural location of the individuals in this study, and the effect it has on 
their wages. Since more urban areas tend to have more public services as well as better public 
transportation, individuals have better access to a wider array of careers and jobs. In more rural 
areas, there tends to be a more homogeneous labor market. Past research has indicated that 
individuals who hold more conservative beliefs would prefer to live in small towns in rural areas, 
while those with more liberal beliefs prefer to live in more urban areas, which are comprised of 
more diverse families and individuals (Desilver, 2014). These ideological beliefs affect how an 
individual raises her family, how many children she prefers, and whether she participates in the 
labor force. So, whether a woman lives in an urban area affects her familial decisions, thus 
affecting her wage.  
 This paper will also differentiate from past analysis of mothers’ wages by using family 
beliefs as the exclusion variable in two Heckman models. Past research has used the cost of 
transportation to work or distance traveled as the differing variable in the first stage for selecting 
whether or not an individual enters the labor force. Instead, both models use variables that 
indicate an individual’s personal beliefs about the role of women or the importance of traditional 
values as exclusion variables, assuming that these conservative or liberal beliefs would affect 
whether an individual enters the labor force or chooses to become a mother, but does not affect 
their wages.  
 This paper found that children negatively affect women’s wages over time by 3% to 4%, 
and paid childcare positively affects women’s wage growth. The first finding reinforces past 
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research, with similar magnitude and direction of past papers, and the second finding indicates 
that mothers who have reliable, childcare (paid or school) have higher wages. This study also 
found that mothers in urban cities have higher wages, which matches assumptions since urban 
areas tend to have better transport and a wider array of job opportunities. Similarly, individuals 
who live in the Northeast, which is characterized by urban areas, earn more over time as well.  
In the following section, I will discuss past literature in economics on the growth of 
mother’s wages and a few past papers on the feminist theory behind the wage gap. In section III, 
I will describe the cross-sectional data set used in my empirical model, as well as evaluate the 
summary statistics for the relevant variables. Section IV presents and explains the theoretical 
model of an individual’s decision process of having a child. Then I apply the theory from the 
model to four separate regressions for the empirical model in Section V. Results are presented in 
Section VI and a policy recommendation is given in Section VII based off of the results and past 
research. Concluding remarks will be given in Section VIII, and figures and tables are given in 
the appendix.  
II. Literature Review 
Over the past three decades there has been an extensive amount of research on the 
relationship between motherhood and wages, both empirical and theoretical. The wage 
differential between mothers and non-mothers has been termed the “family gap” and has been 
studied by a number of economists (Waldfogel, 1998; Budig and England, 2001). Waldfogel 
compared the wages of mothers in the US to other industrialized countries, where she was able to 
draw two conclusions, both which stemmed from the US’ laissez-faire attitude towards public 
goods and services. The US seriously lags behind in not only the amount of provisions provided, 
but also differs by who provides these goods, which is usually private firms in the US. She also 
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found that implementing wage equality legislation does little to better the gap, and instead the 
government needs to create policies that provide maternity leave and accessible childcare, and 
encourage flexible working hours. Budig and England used the NLSY82 data to estimate a fixed 
effects model; they found that there is a 7 percent wage penalty per child, and that the penalty is 
larger for married women than for unmarried women. While they controlled for children and 
part-time work, they theorized that the penalty most likely results from the effects of motherhood 
on productivity or from discrimination from employers.  
Correll et al. (2007) found that in hiring situations, obvious factors indicating motherhood, 
such as PTA meetings, are correlated with lower salaries and fewer employment offers for 
women, which they term as  “motherhood penalties.” Biological fertility events, sex ratios and 
twins, were used by Angrist and Evans (1998) as instrumental variables for the number of 
children in the wage equation; they found that after 13 years of age, the additional child no 
longer affects a woman’s income, and never affected a man’s in the first place. Their IV 
estimates are significant but smaller than the estimates from OLS; the IV estimates were also 
small for educated women and were shown to have no impact from family size on the husband’s 
supply of labor.  
Becker’s 1985 paper on human capital theory predicts that to the extent that mothers spend 
time outside the labor force for family reasons, labor market experience will explain much of the 
wage gap between mothers and non-mothers. Jacobson and Levine (1995) found that controlling 
for labor market experience eliminated the majority of the wage effects for children, but the 
unexplained effects of children remained. This is similar to the findings of Korenman and 
Neumark (1992), who found that children directly lower their mother’s wages by curtailing their 
mothers’ labor supply, thus any accumulation of tenure or experience. They found that 
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heterogeneity leads to biased estimates of marriage and motherhood on wages. Their use of 
instrumental variables suggests that normal OLS cross-sectional and first estimates understate 
the direct effect of children on wages.  
Motherhood delays have also been a popular topic of research in the past few decades. 
Chandler et al. (1994) used OLS to find that with each year of motherhood delay, individuals 
gain 1% of wage increase, however their IV estimates are sensitive to specification and are 
deemphasized in their results, indicating the weakness of their chosen IVs, ‘beliefs.’ Amuedo-
Dorantes and Kimmel (2003) found that delaying motherhood after 30 eliminates the family gap 
altogether, contrasting with previous research by Blackburn et al. (1993), which found 
motherhood had no effect on earnings, despite using similar IVs. Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel 
utilize the NLSY79, where they focused on college-educated women and produced base-line 
results. They found that college-educated mothers do not experience the mother wage gap at all, 
and in fact, they experience a wage boost compared to college-educated childless women. They 
also found that a fertility delay enhances this wage boost, which the authors theorize stems from 
women searching longer for friendly work environments. In comparison, Blackburn et al. 
(1993)’s empirical model found that fertility delay and wages are positively correlated, where 
individuals delayed motherhood in order to attain the assumed proxies for human capital 
(education, job experience), while when they tested for motherhood in general, they found that it 
affected wages very little.  
Two major theories have been introduced to account for the wage difference between 
mothers and non-mothers. Gary Becker introduced in his 1985 paper the concept of the gender 
division of labor, where women who have children and who also work are more likely to be a 
paid less because of the extra amount of work she has to complete at home as well as the work 
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she is given at her job. Becker theorizes that this could be due to exhaustion, a decreased 
dedication to their profession, or a revision of priorities, where a woman may become 
uninterested in receiving a promotion or raise. This agrees with the feminist theory of the 
“second shift,” which theorizes that instead of liberating women by a higher percentage of 
women entering the workforce, they are further inhibited by the increased amount of work 
(Correll et al., 2007). The amount of housework male partners contribute has not majorly 
increased over the past four decades, so women are still expected to the do the majority of the 
cooking, cleaning, and child rearing.  
The other theory that has been introduced involves the time taken off following the birth of a 
child and the effect it has on their future wages. Often in the US, women take a certain period of 
time off in order to bond with their child, thus decreasing their experience in their chosen career. 
This time period can range from six months to multiple years, and though it cannot be denied 
that the cohesion of a family is necessary for a person’s success, a woman’s male peers often do 
not take this time off, and they are able to further their careers. Research has actually shown that 
the gender wage gap decrease when there is paternity leave rather than maternity leave; since 
men take time off to take care of their newborn, the wage gap decreases, childrearing is more 
evenly shared, and children are generally better off (Nepomnyaschy and Waldfogel, 2007). Even 
though the majority of mothers re-enter the workplace, the pause in their careers negatively 
impacts their wages and the future possibility for promotions. Though paid family leave could 
possibly benefit a familial bond, any long extended period of time (some countries require a 
specific amount of time in order for an individual to claim any benefit) would deprive a woman 
from possible opportunities in her career, and they would then be given to her colleagues (male 
and non-mothers).  
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Though there is extensive research on the relationship between women’s wages and children, 
many papers only rely on one model, such as Fixed Effects or Two Staged Least Squares, 
however they rarely comment on the selection bias present in the OLS. Most papers also only 
look at how a single child affects women’s wages, however intuitively, each child compounds 
the work a mother has in her home as well as her stress at work. Also, most papers only analyze 
the typical human capital characteristics associated with wages, so any other factor affecting how 
much they earn and whether they enter the labor market is ignored.  
III. Data and Summary Statistics 
For this paper, my econometric model will use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(1979), focusing on the observations from 1985-2000. This survey consists of panel data from 
1979 to 2012; in 1979 at the time of their first interview, cohorts were 14-22 years old, and were 
47-56 at the time of their last interview. 12,686 cohorts were interviewed in 1979, with both 50% 
female and 50% male. The data set’s cohorts are racially diverse, with 59.1% white, 25.01% 
black, and 15.88% Hispanic/Latino. The whole sample selection was randomly chosen through a 
multi-stage stratified area probability sample of dwelling units and group dwelling quarters in 
1978, then individuals between the ages of 14-22 in 1979 were chosen. Respondents reside in all 
50 states and the District of Columbia. The rate of retention for the survey from 1979 to 2000 is 
90%, indicating very little attrition bias for the years selected for this model. The survey has 
thousands of questions on an individual’s education, family background, employment, fertility, 
beliefs and expectations, health, income, marriage, and children.  
 The data was named and labeled according to the questions in the data set, and all non-
responses were recoded as missing. The data was then reshaped to panel data format, and was 
cleaned for any outliers that have resulted from a coding error. Summary statistics for variables 
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used in the models are given in Table 1 and variable definitions are given in Table 2.The 
summary statistics are for observations recorded for the years between 1985 and 2000. 
Observations following the year 2000 are dropped because: 1) individuals rarely had a child in 
the final years of the survey and 2) since we are evaluating the effect of childcare on women’s 
wages, looking at how children over the age of 7 would not produce significant results. The 
average age of cohorts in this study is 30.5 for women, and over half of the individuals in the 
study live in urban areas. Slightly less than half of all those in the survey are women, and 
compared to the total number of children individuals’ have, cohorts have slightly less children in 
their household. The average family income across panels is around 39,500 dollars and the 
average spousal wage is 27,500 dollars.  
The statements on familial attitude indicate that the overall survey sample has fairly 
progressive views on family and the role of women in the house. For example, concerning 
whether it is better for women to work outside the home, more than half of the cohorts agreed, 
and concerning whether women belong in the home, over half disagreed with the statement. 
However, a question stating that it is better to maintain traditional roles for men and women in 
home, concerning homemaking and earning statuses, the average response was almost half agree 
and half disagree, which goes against the other average response given to the other attitude 
questions. 
 An interesting analysis of the data is found in Table 3, where the attitude variable on 
Traditional Roles is cross summarization with the regional location of individuals (both male and 
female). This question was asked three times over the fifteen-year period of our model. 
Unsurprisingly, the Northeastern United States has the lowest agreement rate with the question 
on Traditional Roles; the Northeast is characterized by more urbanized areas, prominent 
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universities, and liberal political ideology. However, when compared to the other regions, the 
Northeast did not hugely differ from the responses given; 75% of all cohorts in the Northeast 
disagreed with the statement, while the other three regions deviated by at most 4%, with 71% of 
individuals in the Western region disagreeing with the statement. Surprisingly, the Southern 
Region did not widely differentiate from the Northeast, despite of the fact that the South is 
usually stereotyped as more traditional.  
 Another interesting analysis is the cross summarization of an attitude variable on the role 
of women with the urban/rural location of individuals (both male and female), located in Table 4. 
There is almost four times as many individuals in urban areas compared to rural areas, and 88% 
of individuals in urban areas disagreed with the statement compared to the 84% of individuals in 
rural areas. This agrees with the commonly progressive views common in urban areas, where due 
to the higher population, the city government may provide better public services. Individuals in 
rural areas are usually characterized as being more conservative, as well as more likely to work 
in agriculture and manufacturing. However, the small difference may be due to how the survey 
calculated an urban area, where they divided the urban population of a county by the total county 
population and multiplied it by 100. They then characterized a county as rural when the urban 
population is less than 49%. So this may have categorized more rural-like counties as urban, 
possibly skewing the data.  
 One main limitation of the data is the lack of consistency of the questions asked bi-
yearly, and how they are posed to the cohorts. Though there are consistent questions on topics, 
the format differs over the length of the survey, and some years required recoding in order to be 
included. For example, individuals were asked highest-grade level achieved for a block of time, 
and then the survey reworded and recoded the question.  Despite these limitations, the NLSY 
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offers a large amount of information on a diverse set of cohorts. If the selection bias can be 
controlled for, NLSY is the best available data source for the goals of this paper.  
IV. Theoretical Model  
The theoretical model for this paper is illustrating the decision-making process of an 
individual, concerning whether or not to have a child. It can be assumed that individuals who 
have children receive utility from having a child (K), attaining consistent, reliable childcare (Q), 
and a vector of other consumable goods (X). Reliable childcare can be defined as paid services, 
such as a preschool, nursery, or babysitter, as well as another regular arrangement, such as a 
playgroup or in a relative’s care. In this equation, Q is total quality childcare, and at the current 
moment, the fixed price of quality childcare is 0, so PQ=0. 
 It can be assumed that when an individual has a child, she acts as an altruistic economic 
actor, whose utility is maximized when her child’s utility is maximized, which is done through a 
combination of income from her employment and time spent with her child. All demands and 
preferences are identical across all individuals. In this model, having a child provides an 
individual with a large amount of utility, which is why they may choose to reproduce despite the 
high costs. The comparison of utilities of two otherwise identical individuals, one who chooses 
to reproduce (K1) and one who chooses to not reproduce (K0), given the costs children, care, and 
other goods, can be illustrated by:  
U1(𝐾! ,𝑄! ,𝑋! | PK, PQ(1), PX)>U0(𝐾! ,𝑄! ,𝑋! | PK, PQ(0), PX)     (1) 
 Whether or not an individual chooses to have a child and how many to have ultimately 
depends on an individual’s objective to maximize lifetime utility:  
𝑢(𝐾! ,𝑄! ,𝑋!)!!!!           (2)       
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where 𝑇 is the end of life.  
The utility function of a woman facing the decision of having a child can be illustrated 
by:  𝑉 ∗ 𝑝! ,𝑚! = U 𝐾! ,𝑄!𝑋!               (3) 
Where Q is total quality, or individual quality of children multiplied by the number of children, 
and the equation is a function of various prices (p) and income (m). In each different time period, 
t, an individual may receive a different amount of utility from having a child or from the amount 
of care they use. The individual makes decisions considering a budget constraint, illustrated by:  𝑃!!𝐾 + 𝑃!!𝑄 + 𝑃!!𝑋 = 𝑚!𝐸! + 𝑁!                (5) 
Which consists of the price of children  (𝑃!!), which includes food, clothing, and other 
necessities, the price of childcare (𝑃!!), most likely monetary even though these services could be 
exchanged for items or services, and the price of X (𝑃!!). The individual’s income employment 
status is represented by 𝐸!, income is represented by 𝑚!, and non-earned income is represented 
by 𝑁!. The utility function maximizes K, X, and Q, subject to the budget constraint.  
 The corresponding expenditure model consists of:  
eH(v, p)=  𝑃!!K+𝑃!!X+PQQ                 (6) 
    and  
       U(Kt, Qt, Xt)≥ v                           (7) 
Where the individual minimizes the cost of K, X, and Q in order to achieve her given utility 
function. All Hicksian demands of this expenditure model are downward sloping and symmetric 
in their cross-price effects.  
 Since this model presents a decision making process under the assumption that all women 
have the same preferences, this does not hold true for a large portion of women. Individuals can 
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have a preference not to have a child, which cause them to have higher utility from not having a 
child:  
U1(𝐾! ,𝑄! ,𝑋! | PK, PQ(1), PX)<U0(𝐾! ,𝑄! ,𝑋! | PK, PQ(0), PX)        (8) 
However, it is difficult to illustrate different preferences, whether they are due from societal 
pressure or just personal choice, which is why this model operates on the assumption that all 
individuals have homogenous preferences. Another limitation is that this model only operates 
under the assumption that this is an individual’s first child, or that if the individual already has a 
child, this would not affect their choice to have another child.  
 This model predicts that when women maximize their utility by having children they 
simultaneously increase the income needed to provide for their child, assuming that they are 
acting in the best interest of their child, as well as decrease their income by having to pay for 
childcare and by taking time off in order to care for their child. By obtaining childcare, their 
wages theoretically would go up, however their expenses would also increase. The empirical 
model will test how much children will affect women’s wages, as well as if childcare can 
increase their wages, which would allow the individual to pay for childcare in the future.     
V. Empirical Model  
The empirical model used in this paper is comprised of four different econometric models, 
two Heckman Selection models to control for selection bias, a Two Stage Least Squares model to 
control for reverse causality, and a Fixed Effects model to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
These models will evaluate the change in an individual’s wages for fifteen years depending on 
the number of children in their household. The OLS includes independent variables representing 
the cohort’s offspring status, their use of childcare, and typical human capital variables:  
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  𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒!,!!!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,!!! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑦𝑟𝑠!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!"! +𝛽!𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒!,! + 𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛!,!!!" +𝛽!"𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛!,!!!" + 𝜈!,!              (9) 
Where the subscript i represents the economic actor in this model, an adult woman, the subscript 
t is the time period of 1985, when all of the models begin to evaluate individuals, and the 
subscript t+15 indicates the variables that represent relevant information recorded fifteen years 
after original time, t.  
 The independent variable, 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,!, is a continuous variable that indicates the 
number of children an individual has. Evaluating the relationship between the number of children 
in an individual’s household and her wages is based off of Becker’s theory of the Gender 
Division of Labor, where each additional child causes an increase in household work, thus 
increasing a woman’s overall work load, which may decrease the energy an individual could 
devote to their job. 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑦𝑟𝑠!,!!!" is a continuous variable that represents an individual’s highest 
level of education attained, where 12 indicates a completion of high school and 16 indicates a 
completion of a four year college; 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒! is a binary variable representing the an individual’s 
race, where 1 indicates Hispanic, 2 indicates black, and 3 indicates non-hispanic, non-black; and 
the two work experience variables, 𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!" and 𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!"!   are continuous variables which 
represent the length of time, measured in years, an individual has spent in the labor market. 
These two variables represent relevant past experience.  
           𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!,!!!" is a categorical variable that describes the type of childcare used 
by the mother following the birth of her youngest child, where it equals one if the youngest child 
is in preschool or nursery, two if the youngest child is in a daycare group, three if the youngest 
child is in regular school, four if the youngest child is cared for in a different private residence 
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other than their own home, five if youngest child is cared for in their own home by a parent or a 
relative, six if the individual works at home, and seven if the mother takes her youngest child to 
work. Since this variable includes paid forms of childcare, daycare and preschool, the model may 
be endogenous due to the reverse causality that exists the in the relationship between childcare 
and wage. The ability to pay for childcare may only be accessible for those that already earn 
higher wages than average, so the coefficient on the childcare variable may be biased. Though 
the bias is known, it is difficult to account for it in the model, especially since there are no 
instruments in the NLSY79 that would affect the use of childcare and not an individual’s wages.  
 The model also includes a marriage variable, 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑!,!!!", which is a categorical 
variable that indicates an individual’s marital status, where the variable equals zero if the 
individual has never married, one if the individual is currently married, two if the individual is 
currently separated, three if the individual is currently divorced, and four if the individual is 
widowed. The effect of marital status on women’s wages is fairly ambiguous and no past 
research has definitely indicated its impact, whether women experience a boost or a penalty, and 
whether that result is statistically significant (Western & Hewitt, 2005).   
There are two geographical variables, 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛!,!!!" and 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛!,!!!", which evaluate the 
individual’s location and what effect that has on their wages; the former variable is categorical 
and indicates what region of the US the individual lives in, where one indicates that the 
individual lives in the Northeast, two indicates that the individual lives in the North Central part 
of the US, three indicates that the individual lives in the south, and four indicates that the 
individual lives in the Western US. This variable could infer a variety of things about 
individuals, regional policies, and culture. For example, the South and North Central US tend to 
have more conservative policies and culture, which could influence an individual’s decision to 
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become a mother or to enter the workforce. The second geographic variable is binary and 
indicates whether an individual lives in a rural or urban area. Whether or not an individual lives 
in an urban area could affect their wages as well as their access to childcare; since more urban 
areas often offer better public services and public transportation, which allows for women to 
access work easier and may require them to work for higher wages due to higher taxes. Also, 
compared to more rural areas, where there may be homogeneity in terms of possible jobs and 
careers, cities offer a diversity of possible fields, which allow for a wide range of salaries and 
wages. Finally, the mean of the error term, 𝜈!,!, has an expected value of zero given values for 
the independent variables:  𝐸 𝜈!,! 𝑥! = 0                                                            (10) 
An interesting element of the survey is that despite the dozens of questions on childcare, 
none are posed towards the male cohorts of the study. So while it would be interesting to 
evaluate the relative effect of childcare on both men and women’s wages, this paper is only able 
to measure its relationships with women’s wage growth. This omission illustrates possible 
stereotypes and assumptions that were incorporated into the study. Those implemented the study 
may have assumed that men may not know about their child’s care arrangements or that the 
location and caregiver of children was only a woman’s job. Nevertheless, this omission excludes 
single fathers as well as individuals in gay relationships.    
 This model does not control for the sample selection bias that is present due to an 
individual choosing to not participate in the labor force and an individual choosing not to have a 
child. In order to estimate this regression while controlling for this bias, I will use two separate 
Heckman Selection models, which use several variables to estimate each selection equation. The 
model also does not correct for reverse causality between the dependent variable representing 
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wage and the independent variable representing whether or not an individual has had a child. In 
this relationship, future wages could affect when and how many children a woman has, and a 
child could affect a woman’s wage growth over the years. Lastly, this model does not control for 
the effects of unobserved heterogeneity on the results; characteristics, such as preferences, 
productivity, or dedication, which often do not change over time, can affect wages, and these are 
not measured in the data set.  
Heckman Selection Model for Labor Force Participation  
In order to control for sample selection bias that stems from the choice an individual 
makes whether or not to enter the work force, this paper will use a Heckman selection model 
(Heckman, 1979).  In the OLS, we are regressing the number of children they have on their 
wages, assuming that they every female individual is currently in the labor market. However, 
there are individuals every year who are not working or actively looking for work, so our results 
would be skewed because they were estimating the effect of children on individuals’ wages, 
which are zero. A Heckman model was used to account for this type of selection bias in Bar et al. 
(2015), Schafgans & Stelcnery (2006), and Prieto-Rodríguez & Rodríguez-Gutiérrez (2000).  
The model considers that observations are ordered into two regimes, which are defined 
by whether an individual chooses to participate in the labor force. The first stage is the selector 
equation that defines the dichotomous variable, Labor Force Participation (LFP), indicating 
whether or not an individual participates in the labor force:  
 𝐿𝐹𝑃!,!!!"∗ =𝛾! + 𝛾!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝛾!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!"! + 𝛾!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!" + 𝛾!𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑦𝑟𝑠!,!!!" + 𝛾!𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,! +𝛾!𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑!,!!!" + 𝛾!𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒!,!!!" + 𝛾!𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒!,! + 𝜇!    (11) 
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Where  𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!" and 𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!"!  are both continuous variable representing an individual’s work 
experience; 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,! is a continuous variable representing the number of children the 
individual currently has in her household; 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑦𝑟𝑠!,!!!" is a categorical variable indicating the 
highest level of education completed by the individual; 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑!,!!!" is a categorical variable 
indicating an individual’s marital status; 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒!,!!!"  is a categorical variable indicating that the 
race of the individual; and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!   is a continuous variable indicating the current year of analysis. 
The exclusion variable, 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒!,!, represents a question posed to individuals in the survey, 
on whether agree or disagree with the statement that “Women’s role is solely in the home.” The 
variable is binary and coded as one and two if they disagree with the statement and three and 
four if they agree with the statement. If an individual agrees with this attitude statement, this may 
affect their labor force participation, whether or not they stay at home as a housewife or enter the 
work force; however, whether they agree with this statement has little affect on her wage. The 
error term, 𝜇!, has a standard normal distribution.  𝐿𝐹𝑃!!!"∗  is a latent variable which indicates the utility from participating in the labor 
force:  𝐿𝐹𝑃!,!!!" = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝐿𝐹𝑃!,!!!"∗ > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐿𝐹𝑃! = 0  𝑖𝑓  𝐿𝐹𝑃!,!!!"∗ ≤ 0                                       (12) 𝐿𝐹𝑃! is an indicator for labor force status and all of the independent variables in (11) are 
determinants of this status. After estimating the parameter estimators using, the probit maximum 
likelihood method, the second stage of this model involves estimating an OLS regression of 
wages conditional on 𝐿𝐹𝑃! = 1 and a vector of observed explanatory variables (age, education, 
chidcare, etc.), which will be denoted as x in the following equation for simplicity:  𝐸 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒!,!!!" 𝐿𝐹𝑃!,!!!" = 1, 𝑥! = 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝐸 𝜀! 𝐿𝐹𝑃!,!!!" = 1) = 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝐸 𝜀! 𝜇! >   𝛾!!𝑧!)       
(13) 
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where 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒!,!!! is the dependent variable, measured as the amount of money an individual 
earns annually from employment.  𝑥! represents the vector of independent variables of the 
second stage of this model, 𝑧! represents the determinants in (11), 𝛽! represents the parameter 
estimates for the second stage independent variables, and 𝛾!! represents the parameter estimates 
for independent variables in (11). The degree that the normally distributed error term, 𝜀!, of the 
second stage regression equation is correlated with the error term, 𝜇!, of the probit equation is 
represented by ρ. If we assume that the joint distribution of 𝜇! and 𝜀! is bivariate normal, the 
expected value of 𝜀! ,  conditional on 𝜇!, is:          𝐸 𝜀! 𝜇! > 𝛾!!𝑧! = 𝜌𝜎!𝜎! !(!!!!!)!(!!!!!)                                                                       (14) 
where 𝜎! and 𝜎!   are the error variances of the OLS and probit models respectively;  𝜎! is 
unidentified, so it is set to 1. The bracket term, inverse Mills ratio, serves as a control for 
potential biases that arise from sample selectivity and is denoted in the second stage as λ. The 
final model produced by inserting (14) into (13):  𝐸 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒!,!!!" 𝐿𝐹𝑃!,!!!" = 1, 𝑥! = 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒!,!!!"= 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝚤𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑦𝑟𝑠!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!"!+ 𝛽!𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒!!!" + 𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑!,!!!"+ 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛!,!!!" + 𝛽!"𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛!,!!!" + 𝜌𝜎!𝜆!                                           (15) 
where ρ gives the covariance estimate of the unobserved effects on the labor force participation 
and wage decisions. The model is then estimated using the maximum likelihood technique, with 
estimates of the inverse Mills ratio used as starting values in the iteration process.  
Heckman Selection Model for Motherhood Participation  
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 In order to control for sample selection bias that stems from the choice an individual 
makes whether or not to have a child, this paper will use a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 
1979).  Similarly to the first Heckman model used in this paper, this model accounts for the 
selection bias present in the OLS that is due to the decision women make to have a child. This 
type of selection bias is not accounted for in past literature, however regressing the number of 
children on wages for all individuals despite them not having children skews the results. The 
model considers that observations are ordered into two regimes, which are defined by whether an 
individual chooses to become a mother. The first stage is the selector equation that defines the 
dichotomous variable, Motherhood Participation (MP), indicating whether or not an individual 
has a child: 
 𝑀𝑃!,!∗ = 𝜉! + 𝜉!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜉!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!! + 𝜉!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,! + 𝜉!𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑦𝑟𝑠!,! + 𝜉!𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,! +𝜉!𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑!,! + 𝜉!𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒!,! + 𝜉!𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠!,! + 𝜇!        (16) 
 
Where 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒! is a binary variable representing the individual’s gender; 𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!" and 𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!"!  are both continuous variable representing an individual’s work experience; 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,! is a continuous variable representing the number of children the individual 
currently has in her household; 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑦𝑟𝑠!,!!!" is a categorical variable indicating the highest level 
of education completed by the individual; 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑!,!!!" is a categorical variable indicating an 
individual’s marital status; 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒!,!!!"  is a categorical variable indicating that the race of the 
individual; and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!   is a continuous variable indicating the current year of analysis. The 
exclusion variable, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠!,!, represents an individual’s response to an attitude 
question posed by the survey, on whether they agree or disagree with the statement, “It is better 
for everyone if the man provides financially for the family and the woman works in the home, 
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raising children.” The variable is binary and coded as one and two if they disagree with the 
statement and three and four if they agree with the statement. For an individual, their response to 
this question infers some level of liberal or conservative views, which affect an individual’s 
choice to become a mother. However, their response to this question does not affect their wages. 
The error term, 𝜂!, has a normal distribution.  
 𝑀𝑃!,!∗  is a latent variable which indicates the utility from choosing to have a child:  𝑀𝑃!,! = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝑀𝑃!,!∗ > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑀𝑃!,! = 0  𝑖𝑓  𝑀𝑃!,!∗ ≤ 0                                                          (17) 𝑀𝑃! is an indicator for motherhood status and all of the independent variables in (16) are 
determinants of this status. After estimating the parameter estimators using, the probit maximum 
likelihood method, the second stage of this model involves estimating an OLS regression of 
wages conditional on 𝑀𝑃!,! = 1 and a vector of observed explanatory variables (age, education, 
chidcare, etc.), which will be denoted as x in the following equation for simplicity:  𝐸 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒! 𝑀𝑃!,! = 1, 𝑥! = 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝐸 𝜀! 𝑀𝑃!,! = 1) = 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝐸 𝜀! 𝜂! >   𝜉!!𝑡!)              (18) 
where 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒! is the dependent variable, measured as the amount of money an individual earns 
annually from employment.  𝑥! represents the vector of independent variables of the second stage 
of this model, 𝑧! represents the determinants in (16), 𝛽! represents the parameter estimates for the 
second stage independent variables, and 𝜉!! represents the parameter estimates for independent 
variables in (16). The degree that the normally distributed error term, 𝜀!, of the second stage 
regression equation is correlated with the error term, 𝜂!, of the probit equation is represented by 
φ. If we assume that the joint distribution of 𝜂! and 𝜀! is bivariate normal, the expected value of 𝜀! ,  conditional on 𝜂!, is:  𝐸 𝜀! 𝜂! > 𝜉!!𝑡! = 𝜑𝜎!𝜎! !(!!!!!)!(!!!!!)                       (19)                                                                          
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where 𝜎! and 𝜎!   are the error variances of the OLS and probit models respectively;  𝜎! is 
unidentified, so it is set to 1. The bracket term, inverse Mills ratio, serves as a control for 
potential biases that arise from sample selectivity and is denoted in the second stage as Ψ. The 
final model produced by inserting (19) into (18):  𝐸 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒! 𝑀𝑃!,! = 1, 𝑥! = 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒!,!!!"= 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝚤𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑦𝑟𝑠!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!"!+ 𝛽!𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒!!!" + 𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑!,!!!"+ 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛!,!!!" + 𝛽!"𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛!,!!!" + 𝜑𝜎!𝛹!                   (20) 
where φ gives the covariance estimate of the unobserved effects on the motherhood and wage 
decisions. The model is then estimated using the maximum likelihood technique, with estimates 
of the inverse Mills ratio used as starting values in the iteration process. The childcare variables 
are excluded in order not to bias or exclude observations.  
Two-Stage Least Squares for Reverse Causality 
 Based on past literature and general intuition, running the original regression of this 
empirical model:  𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒!,!!!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑦𝑟𝑠!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!"!+ 𝛽!𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑!,!!!"+ 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛!,!!!" + 𝛽!"𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛!,!!!" + 𝜀!,!!!" 
 (21) 
 This OLS model would produce biased estimates due to the reverse causality in the relationship 
of the wage and child variables. Future wages are affected by when, how many, and if a woman 
has children, however expected wages can also affect when, how many, and if a woman has a 
child. If an individual gains more utility from higher wages than having a child, this might cause 
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them to delay motherhood or to not become a mother at all. This feedback effect that 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒!,!!!" has on 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,! produces biased estimates, evident by the covariance 
equation:  𝐶𝑜𝑣   𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒!!!",𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,! ≠ 0                (22) 
In order to control for this simultaneity bias, it is necessary to use a Two-Stage Least 
Squares model. Aside from reverse causality, the stagnation in wages could stem from the 
preferences of the individual in the cohort. For each parent, especially if we assume Becker’s 
assumption of altruism, they have to make an economic decision on what time to allot to raising 
their children and what time to allot to working to financially support those children. This 
tradeoff is difficult to measure on the aggregate level due to the diversity in preferences of 
individuals. A female cohort in the NSLY could simply prefer to have multiple children and 
spend time with those children over working. This preference negatively affects her wages, 
however she may have higher or equal utility than if she chose to allocate the same amount of 
time to her career:  𝑈 𝐼!!!"#! , 𝐿!!!"#! ,𝐻!!!"#! ,𝐸!!!"#! ≥ 𝑈 𝐼!"  !!!"#! , 𝐿!"  !!!"#! ,𝐻!"  !!!"#! ,𝐸!"  !!!"#!           (23) 
Where I represents individual A’s income, L represents individual A’s leisure time, H represents 
individual A’s health, and E represents individual A’s education. Also, an individual may prefer 
to work or may not desire to have any children, evident by the fact that 47.6% of women 
between the ages of 15 and 44 do not have children. For a different individual, they might gain 
equal or higher utility from not having children or working more in order to provide for their 
children, sacrificing time with their family.  𝑈 𝐼!!!"#! , 𝐿!!!"#! ,𝐻!!!"#! ,𝐸!!!"#! ≤ 𝑈 𝐼!"  !!!"#! , 𝐿!"  !!!"#! ,𝐻!"  !!!"#! ,𝐸!"  !!!"#!           (24) 
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This positively influences their wages, however neither of these preferences are taken into 
account in the model due to the lack of data and evidence in the survey.  
 Like past papers, this model will use a measure of  ‘familial values’ or beliefs as an 
instrumental variable. The measure used is a categorical variable indicating a participant’s 
response to a question on whether or not they agree that a woman’s place is in the home. The 
question is coded depending on whether participants strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly 
disagree with them. Based on their use in past papers, these instruments are considered pertinent 
and reliable (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Chandler et al., 1994). These two IVs are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the error term, 𝜀!,!!!:   𝐶𝑜𝑣   𝑆, 𝜀!,!!! = 0              (25) 
where S is a vector of all three IVs. As we have explained above, the two IVs are correlated with 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑!,!:   𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑆,𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,! ≠ 0        (26) 
 In the first stage of this model, we regress the explanatory variable, 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,! ,  on 
our two instrumental variables:  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,! = Π! + Π!𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒!,! + Π!𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒!,! + 𝜔!,! (27) 
where the error term, 𝜔!, is normally distributed and assumed to be uncorrelated with 𝜀!,!!!: 𝐶𝑜𝑣   𝜀!,!!!",𝜔!,! = 0                (28) 
As long as the parameters on these IVs are not equal to zero, they are relevant to the endogenous 
variable, and we do not need new instruments. The fitted value we derive from (27), 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝚤𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,!, would then be plugged into the original linear regression equation (27):  
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  𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒!,!!!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝚤𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑦𝑟𝑠!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!"!+ 𝛽!𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒!!!" + 𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑!,!!!"+ 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛!,!!!" + 𝛽!"𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛!,!!!" + 𝜈!,!                            (28) 
where v is a composite error term that is uncorrelated with the independent variables.  
Fixed Effects Model 
Since we are evaluating individuals over a period of time, it is necessary to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, especially since heterogeneity in this case is constant over time and 
correlated with the independent variables. In this case, the preferences of an individual 
concerning potential family choices and career choices may remain constant over the period of 
time that is being evaluated. For example, some individuals may just prefer their children over 
the length of their careers, which may negatively affect their wages, while some may prefer to 
focus on their career, either putting off having children or just not procreating at all, which would 
positively affect wages. 
The Fixed Effects model is represented by the following question for each 𝑖:  𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒!,!!!" = 𝛽!𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑ℎℎ!,! + 𝛽!𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑦𝑟𝑠!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝!,!!!"! +𝛽!𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!,! +𝛽!𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛!,!!!" + 𝛽!"𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟!   𝛼! + 𝜀!,!!!"                  𝑇 = 1,2,… ,15                    (29)       
Where 𝛼! represents the unobserved characteristics of individuals in the survey, and the 
dependent variables represent observed characteristics about the women in the NLSY that can be 
measured. The independent variable, 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒!,!!!", is normally distributed, and the dependent 
variables are nonstochastic. The fixed effect, 𝛼! , is correlated with the dependent variables (𝑋!,!):  𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑋!,! ,𝛼! ≠ 0          (30) 
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And since the composite error, which is comprised of the fixed effect and error term (𝜀!,!!!"), 
must be uncorrelated with  𝑋!,!, pooled OLS results would be biased due to heterogeneity.  
 For each 𝑖, we average the equation over time, T, and get:  𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒! = 𝛽!𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝚤𝑙𝑑ℎℎ! + 𝛽!𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑦𝑟𝑠! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝!! + 𝛽!𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝚤𝑒𝑑!+ 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝚤𝑜𝑛! + 𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝚤𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒! + 𝛽!𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛! + 𝛽!"𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟!+𝛼!+ 𝜀!               (31) 
where 𝛽!! represents the parameters on all the dependent variables, and 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒! equals:  
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒! = 𝑇!! 𝑦!,!!!!!           (32) 
and 𝑥! equals:  
𝑥!, = 𝑇!! 𝑥!,!!!!!           (33) 
and 𝜀! equals:  
𝜀! = 𝑇!! 𝜀!,!!!!!               (34) 
Since 𝛼! is fixed over time and appears in both equation (29) and (31), and when subtract 
equation (31) from equation (29), we are left with:  𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒! = 𝛽!𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑐ℎ𝚤𝑙𝑑ℎℎ! + 𝛽!𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑦𝑟𝑠! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑥𝑝!! + 𝛽!𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒!,!!!" + 𝛽!𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝚤𝑒𝑑!+ 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑔𝚤𝑜𝑛! + 𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝚤𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒! + 𝛽!𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛! + 𝛽!"𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜀!                   (35) 
where 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒! is the time-demeaned data on y, an similarly for the dependent variables and the 
error term. The fixed effect has disappeared, and we then can estimate equation (35), which is 
comprised of time-demeaned variables, by pooled OLS.  
VI. Model Results 
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The results for each model are located in the appendix in Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7.  
Heckman Selection Model for Labor Force Participation  
 The results for the first Heckman Selection model can be found in Table 5, with the 
standard errors located beneath the coefficients. The Wald-Chi statistic is 3308.93, which is high, 
indicating a significance of the whole regression; the Rho estimation of the Heckman model is -
.971, indicating the OLS estimates were biased, and that individuals with a higher propensity to 
work tend to earn a lower wage. The exclusion parameter in the selector equation, the attitude 
variable on the role of women, is statistically significant, and compared the base answer of 
strongly disagree, those who disagree, agree and strongly agree are less likely to enter the work 
force. This indicates that individuals with more traditional values are less likely to choose to 
enter the workforce. However, those who only agree with the statement are 25% less likely to 
enter the workforce while those who strongly disagree are 17% less likely to enter the workforce, 
which doesn’t agree with the trend that those who have more traditional values are more likely to 
not work.   
 The second stage of the model indicates that each child an individual has in her 
household decreases her annual wages by 10%, which agrees with past literature in direction and 
the assumptions of the model. Each year of work experience and school increase wages by 3% 
and 5% respectively, which indicates that an increase in human development increases income. 
The effect of increased education and work experience has a much smaller effect than the OLS, 
the Heckman model for MP, and the 2SLS, which may be due to how increased education and 
experience biases an individual’s choice to work, and the model removes that bias. Those who 
are categorized as Hispanic earn 9% more than Black women, and with each year, women’s 
wages increase by 4%, which is similar to the overall small, positive increase women have seen 
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over the years. The coefficient for non-black, non-Hispanic is omitted due to collinearity with the 
race variable. The geographic location variables indicate that compared to the Northeast, women 
in all other regions earn less, however the coefficient on the Western region is not statistically 
significant. In Table 9, the Heckman model was conducted by region, where surprisingly, 
individuals in the Northeast experienced the largest decrease in wages, and those in the West 
experienced the smallest, with those in the South had only a 5% decrease. Women who have a 
higher education attainment level in the south receive a higher wage compared to those with 
similar schooling in the other regions, with each year of education increasing an individual’s 
wage by 7%. This infers that those who are college educated is much more valuable in the South, 
possibly because it may be less common to have job applicants with those credentials. Similarly, 
those who live in the Northeast or South receive the largest increase in their wages, around 5%, 
with each additional year of work experience. Those who live in urban areas earn 9.8% more 
than those who live in rural areas, and when modeled by region, those who live in the West and 
Northeast benefit the most from living in urbanized locations.  
 The Childcare variable is positive and statistically significant, indicating that those who 
have regular childcare for their youngest child, have a 6.8% increase in their wages. Compared to 
the base of an individual bringing her child to work, the women who have their child watched at 
home, however the coefficient is small and not statistically significant. Those who use daycare 
groups, which is normally a paid form of childcare, increase a woman’s wages by 35%. 
However, this large increase may be biased due to the fact that individuals who use paid 
childcare usually earn more than those who do not. This bias is difficult to control for, especially 
given the data set.  Those who work at home and simultaneously watch their youngest child see a 
40% decrease in their wages compared to those who bring their children to work with them; this 
	   	   Killian	  	   33	  
result possibly indicates that those these individuals may be less efficient since they also have to 
care for their child.  
Heckman Selection Model for Motherhood Participation  
 Similarly, the results for the Heckman Selection model, which can be found in Table 5, 
for motherhood indicate that the OLS results are biased; the Wald-Chi statistic is 6656.81, which 
indicates that the entire regression is significant, and the estimation of Rho is -.957, which 
indicates that the OLS results are biased, meaning those who have the highest propensity to be a 
mother have the lowest wages, which agrees with expectations. Almost half of the observations 
are censored; further indicating the original OLS was biased. The exclusion parameter in the 
selector equation, the attitude variable on an individual’s opinion on traditional roles is 
statistically significant for the agreement answer compared to the base answer of strongly 
disagree, however for those only disagree the coefficient is small and insignificant. Compared to 
the base answer of strongly disagree, those who strongly agree that traditional roles are best for 
family are 29% more likely to choose to become a mother. Those who only disagree are only 4% 
more likely to choose to be a mother.  
 The second stage of the model yields very similar results to the Heckman model for 
Labor Force Participation, where each child decreases a woman’s wage by 11.7%; each year of 
schooling increases wage by 16.6%, which is much larger than the first Heckman model. This 
model shows that each additional year of work experience negatively affects an individual’s 
wages, however its squared value is positive, indicating that experience is convex (see figure 2). 
In this model, those who are categorized as Hispanic actually earn 11% less than black 
individuals and with each year, an individual’s wage increase by 5%, which coincides with the 
slow, positive change seen in overall women’s wages. The geographic location variables are all 
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negative compared to the base answer of Northeast, and those in the Western region have the 
smallest decrease, while those in the South have the largest decrease, with 12%. Those who live 
in urban areas see an increase in wages by 10%, which is very similar to the first Heckman 
model.  
 The Childcare variable is positive and statistically significant, indicating that those who 
have regular childcare for their youngest child, have a 7.5% increase in their wages. Similar to 
the results from the first Heckman model, the childcare options compared to the base of an 
individual bringing her child to work, the women who have their child watched at home and the 
women who watch their children while they work experience a negative effect on their wages, 
however the coefficient on the variable indicating that an individual who has their child watched 
at home by a relative is not statistically significant. Those who use daycare groups, which is 
normally a paid form of childcare, increase a woman’s wages by 39%. And both those whose 
youngest child is in regular school and those whose youngest child is watched in a different 
residence by a relative see a 20% increase in their wage. Similar to the first model, these results 
may be biased since only those who use paid forms of childcare are those who already earn 
higher wages. This is difficult to control and not accounted for in this model. Similarly to the 
first Heckman Model, individuals who work at home and simultaneously watch their youngest 
child see a 45% decrease in their wages compared to those who bring their child to work.  
Two-Stage Least Squares for Reverse Causality 
 The first stage results for the 2SLS model are found in Table 6, where the instruments in 
the first stage of the model are statistically significant. For individuals who agree with the 
statement that a woman’s role is in the home, they are .48 more likely to have a child, while 
those who disagree with the statement are only .18 more likely to have a child, which indicates 
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that even though a woman may not hold these traditionally conservative views, she may still 
choose to have a child. The F-Value of the first stage is 77.89, which is in the range for 
instrument validity.  
 The second stage of the model produces statistically significant results, evident by the F-
Value of 421.34. Like the previous two models as well as the OLS, the number of children has a 
significant negative affect on women’s wages, where each additional child in the household 
decreases wages by 58%, which is a much larger decrease than both OLS and the Heckman 
models. This large positive relationship may be due to the fact that the instruments indicating an 
individual’s opinion on family and children may only affect those who feel strongly about the 
statement. So those who believe that women’s role is in the home, raising children, are much 
more affected by the instruments, while those who did not necessary have a strong reaction to 
this statement were not adequately accounted for by the instruments.  
Like the previous models, both variables indicating work experience and education 
indicate a positive increase in wages with and increase in human development. This model also 
shows that with each additional year, women experience a 4% increase in their wages, which is 
similar to the other models and past research. When accounting for reverse causality, individuals 
who are currently or previously married have a small increase in wages compared to those that 
have not been married, which differs from our other regressions.  
 Individuals who use any form of childcare for their youngest child also see a 8.8% 
increase in their wages compared individuals who bring their children to work, and those that use 
paid forms of childcare, such as daycare, see a 48% increase in their wages compared to those 
who bring their youngest child to work. Similar to the results from both Heckman models, 
individuals who work at home and simultaneously watch their see a 38% decrease in their wages, 
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which intuitively makes sense, since these individuals may be less efficient since they may be 
forced to take more breaks in order to care for their child. Individuals who live in the Southern 
and North Central regions of the US earn 14% and 10% less than those who live in the 
Northeast, and those who live in the Western region only earn 6% less. When evaluating this 
model by region, which is shown in Table 8 in the appendix, individuals who live in the 
Northeast actually experience a positive effect on their wages when they have a child, however 
this results is not statistically significant. Those who live in the south experience the largest 
decrease in wages, however this may be due to the fact that the instruments used in the model are 
only representing individuals who hold these strong beliefs. Individuals in all regions experience 
a similar increase in their wages with each additional year of education, while women in the 
South see a 17% increase in their wages with each additional year of work experience, indicating 
that long-term employment may benefit women more than a large amount of education. Though 
individuals who live in urban areas do earn more than those in rural areas, the negative impact is 
half as severe compared to the OLS results; and when modeled by region, those who live in 
urban areas in the West see a 12% increase in the wages, which is much larger than the increase 
seen in the Northeast, South, or North Central regions.  
Fixed Effects Model 
 The results for the Fixed Effect Model are given in Table 5. The F-test for the model is 
less than 0.05, indicating that the coefficients in the model are different from 0. The errors are 
negatively correlated with the regressors in the model and 80% of variance is due to differences 
across panels, indicating that the model is partially biased due to unobserved, consistent factors. 
When accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, women earn 3% less with each additional child, 
which is smaller in magnitude than the previous models and OLS. The effect of increased 
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education is negative, which goes against all previous research, however it is not significant at 
the 5% or 10% level; the effect of increased experience is also negative, which also goes against 
how work experience normally affects wages. Those who are currently or previously married 
have 3.5% higher wages than those have never been married, however the coefficient is not 
statistically significant at the 5% or 10% level, and the results does not largely differ from the 
coefficient given by OLS.  
 The use of any form of childcare has a small positive increase of 1.6% on wages, 
however this number does largely differentiate from 0 and is much smaller than the results of the 
other models. Similar to the other models and OLS, individuals who work at home with their 
children see a 45% decrease in their wages compared to those who bring their child to work. 
Individuals who have their youngest child watched at home by a spouse or a relative also see a 
8% decrease in their wages. All other forms of childcare are positive, however none of them are 
statistically significant. Individuals who live in the North Central and Southern regions have a -
15% and -13% decrease on wages compared to those who live in the Northeast, which is similar 
to the results in the other models. However, those who live in the West have a -17% decrease in 
their wages, which is much larger than the results found in all of the other models. After 
evaluating this model by region, there was no differentiation in the coefficients on the variable 
representing the number of children in a household, so the results were not provided in the 
appendix. Individuals who live in urban have earn 5% more than those who live in rural areas, 
which is comparable to what the other models produced.  
VII. Policy Recommendation  
Based off of the results found in this paper as well as past research on the affordability of 
childcare, it would benefit women, and thus families and the overall economy, for the 
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government to provide childcare subsidies. This paper, which is similar to the results of past 
research, has indicated that each additional child negatively affects wages. This fact combined 
with the finding that childcare has a positive affect on women’s wages possibly leads to a 
possible solution for the dilemma that women face when working and being a mother. When 
controlling for selection bias, care causes a 6% to 11% increase in wages, and when controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity, care increases wages by 1.3%. For all models except the Fixed 
Effects Model, paid childcare, specifically daycare groups, cause a significant increase in wages 
(see figure 7). Similar results are found for individuals, whose children are in regular school. The 
theory behind these large increases is that paid childcare like daycare groups and state-funded 
care, like public schools, provide more reliable, consistent care, which allows mothers to work 
uninterrupted throughout their day and to possibly work longer hours. A subsidy would allow 
women from all socioeconomic backgrounds to have access to this service, thus positively 
affecting their income, as well as reassuring them of the quality of the care.  
 According to a paper from the Economic Policy Institute, childcare costs account for the 
greatest variability in family budgets, where monthly childcare costs for a four year old may 
range from $344 in South Carolina to $1,472 in Washington D.C. For some families, childcare 
costs may be as high as half of rent in urban areas. Despite women earning more in urban areas, 
childcare is still expensive and a subsidy would benefit not only families but also firms. 
Childcare costs are significantly higher for younger children; and since this paper found that the 
use childcare for an individual’s youngest child significantly affects their wages, a subsidy would 
benefit individuals and families (Gould & Cooke, 2015).  
 The amount of subsidy for childcare would vary by state, and would need to be consistent 
with the rising price of childcare. Instead of providing state-controlled childcare, childcare 
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subsidies allow for variety of preferences that individuals may have. Though the effect of 
children on women’s wages vary by state, each additional child negatively affects a woman’s 
job, which may affect what a mother can provide for her children. By providing a subsidy, a 
woman can then decide how often and long she prefers to work, as well as how often and how 
long she prefers to spend time with her child. She also can choose what type of childcare she 
prefers, allowing for more freedom in consumer choice.  
VIII. Conclusion  
This paper presents causal evidence that the number children and the use of childcare 
positively affects women’s wages, and thus overall career earnings. By evaluating panel data 
over a fifteen-year period of time, and accounting for selection bias, reverse causality, and 
unobserved heterogeneity in different models, I found that each additional child has a significant 
negative affect on wages. Childcare has a significant positive effect on wage growth over time, 
and paid childcare largely increases annual wages. The implications of these results infer that 
paid childcare, which is often better quality, allow women to focus on their jobs at work, rather 
than worrying about who is watching their child, thus possibly increasing their productivity.  
The paper also evaluated how geographic regions and the urban/rural effect of an 
individual’s location has on her wages. Those who live in urban areas have higher wages than 
those who live in rural areas, which may be due to the larger amount of available jobs as well as 
the diversity of jobs in urban areas (Figure 4). Corresponding to this finding, individuals who 
live in the Northeast have higher wages than those who live in the South or the North Central 
region of the US, especially since the Northeast is historically more urban, with a wider variety 
of opportunities for their labor force (Figure 5). Both urban areas and the Northeast are 
statistically more politically liberal areas, so using location as proxy for beliefs, all models 
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including OLS show that those live in these areas, and thus are less conservative, earn more. This 
is possibly due to the greater opportunities offered in more urbanized areas, however it is 
difficult to tell whether the job opportunities always existed, or that these higher pay jobs were 
created by the liberal population. This paper focuses on the economic actor as the employee, 
however these ideological beliefs could affect managers and employers, dictating whom they 
hire, which would also influence wages. Further research on how ideological beliefs affect hiring 
patterns would certainly aid these conclusions.  
Across all five models, we see a small increase in wages for each additional year, and the 
negative effect of each additional child, which is similar to the consensus of past literature. The 
results of the two Heckman Models and 2SLS are significant, and they indicate similar effects on 
wages. All three models show a negative effect due to the increasing number of children, a 
positive effect due to childcare use, and a large positive effect that stems from the use of paid 
childcare compared to an individual to her child to work. All three models use family values as 
either an exclusion variable or an instrument, and the results, F-values, and Wald-Chi indicate 
that they are valid, which infers that ideological beliefs affect an individual’s familial choice. 
The results of the Fixed Effects Model are similar, however, the childcare coefficient is small 
and not differentiable from zero.  
Though all models offer some advantages, the Two-Stage Least Squares provides significant 
results that are similar to both Heckman models, however almost all of the 2SLS model’s 
parameters are statistically significant. The disadvantage of this model is the coefficient on the 
Numchildhh, which is much larger than the other models as well as the results found in previous 
literature. The two Heckman models’ results are very similar to the OLS, possibly indicating that 
the main bias was not due to a selection decision. The Fixed Effects model does result in a -3% 
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decrease in wages due to an increase in children, which matches previous literature, however 
many of the coefficients are statistically significant and since we are not evaluating the 
consequences of a specific event, the Fixed Effects model may not be the most advantageous 
model used.  
Despite some small variation in the models used, the results from all regressions indicate 
childcare’s positive effect on wages as well as children’s negative effect on wages, which echoes 
past research (Figure 6). School and daycare groups have large positive effects, which make 
sense considering the reliability and the hours of operation provided by both forms. Though the 
results for paid childcare may be biased since many who use paid childcare are those who 
usually earn more than those who do not, there is a positive effect on wages by paying for care, 
since individuals can be more efficient by knowing that their children are reliably being taken 
care of. Similarly, the increase in wages of those whose youngest child is in school may be due 
to the decreasing amount of work required with children who are of school, allowing mothers to 
focus more on their jobs. With the topic of the affordability and importance of childcare popular 
among policymakers, the results of this paper illustrate how childcare may possibly reduce the 
gender wage gap by increasing mother’s wages. In order to eliminate gender inequity as well as 
increase GDP, it would be advantageous for the government to provide a subsidy for families to 
pay for childcare.   
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Appendix 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Variables in Data Set	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	  VARIABLES	   N	   mean	   sd	   min	   max	  	   	   	   	   	   	  Year	   106,811	   1,992	   6.731	   1,979	   2,004	  Race	   106,811	   2.433	   0.751	   1	   3	  Sex	   106,811	   2	   0	   2	   2	  Region	   70,417	   2.622	   0.980	   1	   4	  Urban	   69,105	   0.788	   0.418	   0	   2	  Wage	   68,862	   13,518	   16,714	   0	   265,933	  Married	   71,171	   1.048	   0.943	   0	   4	  Spousewage	   53,523	   27,503	   27,132	   0	   242,361	  Familyincome	   45,366	   39,475	   74,815	   0	   1.057e+06	  Lnwage	   52,789	   9.303	   1.181	   0	   12.49	  Offspringwanted	   106,811	   0.942	   0.234	   0	   1	  Womenrole	   97,754	   1.603	   0.714	   1	   4	  Womenpurpose	   97,268	   2.427	   0.832	   1	   4	  Childcarearrange	   44,211	   3.781	   1.305	   1	   7	  Mothertimework	   17,541	   1.960	   0.721	   1	   4	  Traditionalroles	   106,681	   2.069	   0.747	   1	   4	  Employmentstatus	   59,124	   2.208	   1.873	   1	   8	  Numchildhh	   71,173	   1.442	   1.312	   0	   11	  Numchildren	   71,176	   1.519	   1.355	   0	   11	  Age	   97,325	   30.56	   7.104	   14	   47	  Age2	   97,325	   984.4	   443.6	   196	   2,209	  Years	  of	  Schooling	   70,906	   12.94	   2.391	   0	   20	  Exp	   70,906	   12.40	   6.239	   0	   41	  Exp2	   70,906	   192.8	   178.8	   0	   1,681	  Childage	   73,965	   9.915	   7.257	   0	   34	  Chagecat	   73,965	   3.439	   1.615	   0	   5	  Dchild	   73,965	   0.884	   0.321	   0	   1	  Hispanic	   106,811	   0.159	   0.366	   0	   1	  Black	   106,811	   0.248	   0.432	   0	   1	  Other	   106,811	   0.592	   0.491	   0	   1	  Ageyoungestchild	   42,172	   6.671	   4.951	   1	   31	  Agefirst	   59,515	   21.65	   4.574	   11	   43	  Age2nd	   22,853	   20.32	   8.631	   1	   44	  Agethird	   18,176	   25.86	   4.417	   15	   44	  Childcare1in2	   24,983	   2.095	   0.986	   1	   6	  Childcare1in3	   25,262	   2.398	   1.178	   1	   9	  Childcare2in1	   10,408	   1.948	   0.900	   1	   6	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  Childcare2in2	   9,895	   2.092	   0.991	   1	   6	  Childcare2in3	   8,790	   2.277	   1.068	   1	   6	  Childcare3in1	   2,130	   1.909	   0.979	   1	   4	  Childcare3in2	   1,496	   1.975	   0.916	   1	   4	  Childcare3in3	   1,892	   2.179	   1.141	   1	   6	  Traditionaldisagree	   106,811	   0.754	   0.431	   0	   1	  Traditionalagree	   106,811	   0.245	   0.430	   0	   1	  Womenpurposeagree	   106,811	   0.424	   0.494	   0	   1	  Womenroledisagree	   106,811	   0.825	   0.380	   0	   1	  Womenpurposedisagree	   106,811	   0.486	   0.500	   0	   1	  Womenroleagree	   106,811	   0.0900	   0.286	   0	   1	  Childcare1in1	   2,394	   2.109	   1.191	   1	   7	  Daycaregroups	   106,811	   0.0367	   0.188	   0	   1	  School	   106,811	   0.0529	   0.224	   0	   1	  Careindifferenthome	   106,811	   0.198	   0.398	   0	   1	  Homecarebyrelative	   106,811	   0.0690	   0.253	   0	   1	  Bringschildtowork	   106,811	   0.0323	   0.177	   0	   1	  Worksathome	   106,811	   0.0126	   0.111	   0	   1	  Preschool/nursery	   106,811	   0.0128	   0.113	   0	   1	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Table 2: Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition  Type and Coding 
Race  Race or ethnicity of R Categorical 
1:Hispanic 
2: Black 
3: Non-Hispanic, non-black 
Sex Sex of R Binary:  
1:Male 
2: Female 
Number of Children in 
Household 
 
The number of children R 
currently has in his/her 
household 
Continuous 
Child Desired Number of children desired 
by R 
Continuous 
Married  Marital status of R Categorical 
0: Never Married 
1:Married 
2: Separated 
3:Divorced 
5: Remarried 
6: Widowed 
School Years Number of School years 
completed by R 
Categorical 
0: No education 
12: 12th Grade 
16: 4 year college degree 
Age Age of R Continuous 
Wage of Spouse Wages of R’s spouse Continuous 
Wage Wage’s of R Continuous 
Family Income Income of R’s family 
excluding his/her 
contribution 
Continuous 
Experience Potential Labor Market 
Experience 
Continuous 
Urban R currently lives in a urban 
or rural area 
Binary 
0: rural 
1: urban 
Region  Current area of the US R 
lives in 
Categorical 
1: Northeast 
2: North Central 
3: South 
4: West 
Lnwage Natural log of wage Continuous 
Womenrole Attitude question: A 
woman’s place is in the 
home 
Categorical 
1:Strongly disagree 
2: Disagree 
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3: Agree  
4: Strongly Agree 
Womenpurpose  Attitude question: A 
working wife feels more 
useful than one who does 
not have a job 
Categorical 
1:Strongly disagree 
2: Disagree 
3: Agree  
4: Strongly Agree 
Childcare Arrangement Type of Childcare 
arrangement for Youngest 
Child 
Categorical  
1: R brings child to work 
2:Daycare Group 
3:Regular School 
4:Care in different private 
residence 
5: Home care by 
parent/relative   
6:R works at home  
7:Preschool/Nursery 
 
Type of Childcare in the 
first year for the first child 
 
Type of childcare for first 
child in the first year 
Categorical  
1:Preschool or nursery 
2:Daycare group 
3:Regular School  
5: care in the home by 
sibling or parent 
4:care in a different private 
residence 
5: care in the home by 
sibling or parent 
6:R works at home  
7: R brings child to work 
Traditionalroles Attitude question: It is 
better for everyone if the 
man provides financially for 
the family and the woman 
works in the home, raising 
children 
Categorical 
1:Strongly disagree 
2: Disagree 
3: Agree  
4: Strongly Agree 
Employment status  Current status of 
employment  
Categorical 
1:Working  
2: With job not at work  
3:Unemployed 
4:Keeping house 
5:Going to School 
6: Unable to work 
7: Other 
8: Armed Forces 
Type of Childcare in the Type of childcare for first Categorical  
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second year for the first 
child 
 
child in second year 1: care in the home by 
sibling or parent 
2:care in a different private 
residence 
3:Preschool or nursery 
4:Daycare group 
5:Regular School  
6:R works at home  
Type of Childcare in the 
third year for the first child 
 
Type of childcare for first 
child in third year 
Categorical  
1: care in the home by 
sibling or parent 
2:care in a different private 
residence 
3:Preschool or nursery 
4:Daycare group 
5:Regular School  
6:R works at home  
Type of Childcare in the 
first year for the second 
child 
 
Type of childcare for 
second child in first year 
Categorical  
1: care in the home by 
sibling or parent 
2:care in a different private 
residence 
3:Preschool or nursery 
4:Daycare group 
5:Regular School  
6:R works at home  
Type of Childcare in the 
second year for the second 
child 
 
Type of childcare for 
second child in the second 
year 
Categorical  
1: care in the home by 
sibling or parent 
2:care in a different private 
residence 
3:Preschool or nursery 
4:Daycare group 
5:Regular School  
6:R works at home 
Type of Childcare in the 
first year for the third child 
 
Type of childcare for third 
year in the first year 
Categorical  
1: care in the home by 
sibling or parent 
2:care in a different private 
residence 
3:Preschool or nursery 
4:Daycare group 
5:Regular School  
6:R works at home 
Type of Childcare in the 
second year for the third 
Type of childcare for third 
child in the second year 
Categorical  
1: care in the home by 
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child 
 
sibling or parent 
2:care in a different private 
residence 
3:Preschool or nursery 
4:Daycare group 
5:Regular School  
6:R works at home 
Type of Childcare in the 
third year for the third child 
 
Type of childcare third 
child in the third year 
Categorical  
1: care in the home by 
sibling or parent 
2:care in a different private 
residence 
3:Preschool or nursery 
4:Daycare group 
5:Regular School  
6:R works at home 
Bringschildtowork R brings youngest child to 
work 
Binary 
0: Does not bring youngest 
child to work 
1: Brings youngest child to 
work   
Daycare R uses a daycare groups for 
youngest child 
Binary 
0: Does not use daycare 
group 
1:Uses for daycare group 
School R uses regular school for 
the care of their youngest 
child 
Binary 
0:Does not use regular 
school 
1: Uses regular school 
Careindifferenthome R uses care in a different 
private residence for 
youngest child 
Binary 
0: Does not use care in 
private residence 
1:Uses care in private 
residence 
Homecarebyrelative R uses care in home for 
youngest child by a relative 
Binary 
0: Does not use care in 
home 
1: Uses care in home 
Worksathome R works at home and uses 
home care for youngest 
child 
Binary 
0: Does not work at home  
1: R works at home 
Preschool/Nursery R uses preschool/nursery 
for youngest child 
 
Binary 
0: R does not use 
preschool/nursery 
1: R uses preschool/nursery 
for youngest child 
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Table 3: States by Region  
Northeast North Central South West 
Connecticut 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
Vermont 
 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
South Dakota 
Wisconsin 
 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Delaware 
District of Columbia 
Florida 
Georgia 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maryland 
Mississippi 
North Carolina 
Oklahoma 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
Alaska 
Arizona 
California 
Colorado 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Montana 
Nevada 
New Mexico 
Oregon 
Utah 
Washington 
Wyoming 
 
 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics of Traditional roles Crossed with Region Variable  
 Opinion on whether it is better for a to solely provide for his family 
Current 
Region of R 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Total 
Northeast  5,102     (75%)  12,783        5,082          877 (25%) 23,844 
South  9,128  (72%) 30,015   13,012  2,259  (28%) 54,414 
North Central  5,461 (73%)  18,304   7,432   929 (27%) 32,126 
West 4,506 (71%) 15,049  6,908  1,040 (29%) 27,503 
Total   24,197     76,151       32,434        5,105 137,887 
Note: This table cross examines how individuals (both male and female) who respond to the 
statement, “It is better for everyone if the man provides financially for the family and the woman 
works in the home, raising children” with their regional location.  
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Table 5: Summary Statistics of Womenrole Crossed with Urban/Rural Variable  
 Opinion on whether women belong in the home 
Rural/Urban Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Total 
 
Rural 	  9,373	  	  (84.6%)	   14,642	   3,590	   756	  (15.4%) 28,361	   
Urban 	  42,542	  (88%) 48,780	   9,920	   	  2,405	  	  (12%) 	  103,647	   
Unknown 228	   278	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   59	   10	   575	   
Total 52,143	  	  	  	  	  	   63,700	   13,569	   3,171	   132,583	   
Note: This table cross-examines how individuals (both male and female) respond to the 
statement, “A woman’s place is in the home” with whether they live in an urban or rural area.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   	   Killian	  	   53	  
Table 6: Estimates of all Models 
   OLS 
 
Heckman (1) Heckman (2) 2SLS FE 
Numchildhh -.0842    
(.0056)*** 
 
-.1081           
(.0075)***  
-.1172 
(.0060)*** 
-.5887   
(.0944)*** 
-.0323   
(.0069)*** 
Schoolyears .1394 
(.0033)*** 
 
.04980 
(.0044)*** 
.1663 
(.0043)*** 
.1386   
(.0047)*** 
-.3748   
(.6218)*** 
Experience .1085   
(.0056)*** 
 
.0334 
(.0065)*** 
-.1039 
(.0062)*** 
.1164   
(.0095)*** 
-.4192  
(.6219)*** 
Experience2 -.0019    
(.0002)*** 
 
-.0005 
(.0002)*** 
.0028 
(.0002)*** 
-.0021   
(.0002)*** 
-.0010   
(.0001)*** 
Race .1485   
(.0130)*** 
 
.0071  
(.0131) 
.0112 
(.0137) 
-.0497   
(.0251)** 
0 
(Omitted) 
Year .0134   
(.0025)*** 
 
.0438 
(.0034)*** 
.0549 
(.0033)*** 
.0477   
(.0035)*** 
.5268    
(.6219)*** 
Hispanic .3692   
(.0258)*** 
 
.0967 
(.0213)*** 
-.1113 
(.0237) 
.0897   
(.0369)** 
0 
(Omitted) 
Other 0 
(Omitted) 
 
0  
(Omitted) 
0 
(Omitted) 
0 
(Omitted) 
0 
(Omitted) 
Married -.0051   
(.0061) 
 
-.1051 
(.0077)*** 
-.1239 
(.0076)*** 
.0167   
(.0076)** 
.0351   
(.0074)*** 
Childcarearrange .1191   
(.0078)*** 
.0684   
(.0058)*** 
.0757   
(.0062)*** 
.0887   
(.0088)*** 
.0130    
(.0118) 
 
Worksathome -.6978   
(.0554)*** 
-.4052   
(.0423)*** 
-.4505   
(.0444)*** 
-.3835   
(.0673)*** 
-.4585   
(.0822)*** 
 
Daycare .7086   
(.0331)*** 
.3524    
(.0260)*** 
.3999    
(.0272)*** 
.4798   
(.0399)*** 
.0595   
 (.0560) 
 
School .2345   
(.0305)*** 
.1655   
(.0232)*** 
.2054    
(.0245)*** 
.3368   
(.0312)*** 
.0226     
(.0469) 
 
Careindifferenthome .3718   
(.0245)*** 
.1780   
(.0185)*** 
.2058   
(.0197)*** 
.2636   
(.0265)*** 
-.0194   
(.0367) 
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Homecarebyrelative .4446   
(.0266)*** 
-.0206   
(.0213) 
-.4505   
(.0444) 
.0561    
(.0350) 
-.0835   
(.0412)** 
 
Preschool/Nursery 0 
(Omitted) 
 
0 
(Omitted) 
0 
(Omitted) 
0 
(Omitted) 
0 
(Omitted) 
North Central -.1010   
(.0180)*** 
 
-.1131 
(.0150)*** 
-.1160 
(.0160) 
-.1008   
(.0233)*** 
-.1523   
(.0585) 
South -.0598   
(.0162)*** 
 
-.1156 
(.0135)*** 
-.1242 
(.0146)*** 
-.1402    
(.0228)*** 
-.1321   
(.0496) 
West -.03207   
(.0195) 
 
-.0264 
(.0166) 
-.0338 
(.0179)* 
-.0660   
(.0239)*** 
-.1700   
(.0613)* 
Urban .0847   
(.0127)*** 
 
.0990 
(.0113)*** 
.1007 
(.0117)*** 
.0425   
(.0181)*** 
.0521   
(.0156)** 
Constant -21.7545   
(5.03397)*** 
 
-78.7479  
(6.6327)*** 
-101.2615 
(6.4334)*** 
-87.4111   
(6.7471)*** 
-1032.257   
(1223.051)*** 
F Statistic 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of 
Observations 
36,321 45,471 49,242 27,694 36,321 
R-Squared/ Wald 
Chi Squared 
0.1922 3308.93 6656.81 0.1137 0.0047 
Notes:  
1. * if significant at P<.10, ** if significant at P<.05, *** if significant at P<.01 
2. Standard errors are in parenthesis 
3. Heckman (1) controls for selection bias for Labor Force Participation (Equation 15) 
4. Heckman (2) controls for selection bias for Motherhood Participation (Equation 20) 
5. Numchildhh and childcarearrange are the variables of interest, and Lnwage is the 
dependent variable  
6. The first stage of the 2SLS is located in Table 7.  
7. The first Heckman model used a question concerning familial attitudes, Womenrole, for 
the exclusion parameter in the first stage.  
8. The second Heckman model used a question concerning gender roles, Traditionalroles, 
for the exclusion parameter in the first stage.  
9. The FE model controls for unobserved heterogeneity across panels, where ai represented 
unobserved characteristics in the model, and the average of each variable was subtracted 
from the original equation, eliminating ai (Equations 31 and 29).  
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Table 7:  Regressions for 2SLS Model: First Stage 
Numchildhh     
Variable Coefficient t  P>|t| 95% Confidence Interval 
Womenrole Agree .4357 
(.0794) 
  5.49 0.000 .2800           .5913 
Womenrole 
Disgaree 
.1809 
(.0771) 
  2.35 0.019 .0298           .3321 
Schyrs -.0199   
(.0036) 
 -5.58 0.000 -.0270         -.0129 
Exp .0798   
(.0049) 
 16.22 0.000 .0701           .0894 
Experience2 -.0017   
(.0001) 
-11.67 0.000 -.0019        -.0014 
Race -.2067   
(.0137) 
-15.13 0.000 -.2334        -.1799 
Year .0166   
(.0027) 
  6.16 0.000 .0113           .0219 
Hispanic -.1970   
(.0271) 
 -7.26 0.000 -.2502         -.1439 
Other 0 
(Omitted) 
   
Married -.0224    
(.0062) 
-3.63 0.000 -.0345      -.0103 
Childcarearrange -.0369    
(.0068) 
-5.46 0.000 -.0501      -.0236 
Worksathome .4395   
(.0442) 
9.95 0.000 .3530        .5261 
Daycare -.2202   
(.0280) 
-7.85 0.000 -.2752     -.1652 
School       .0861           
     (.0256) 
3.36 0.001 .0359        .1364 
Careindifferenthome -.0709   
(.0217) 
-3.27 0.001 -.1134      -.0285 
Homecarebyrelative .1629   
(.0269) 
 6.07 0.000 .1102        .2155 
Preschool/Nursery 0 
(Omitted) 
   
Region 
North Central .0709   
(.0189) 
3.76 0.000 .0340        .1079 
South -.1021   
(.0174) 
-5.86 0.000 -.1363      -.0679 
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West .0206  
(.0202) 
1.02 0.309 -.0191       .0602 
Urban -.0862   
(.0134) 
-6.42 0.000 -.1129       -.0599 
Constant -29.2737   
(5.3136) 
-5.51 0.000 -39.6887   -18.8587 
F-Test of Excluded 
Variables  
F(2, 27674) 
77.89 
Notes:  
1. Standard errors are in parenthesis 
2. Table 7 shows the first stage of the 2SLS, where the two instruments, Womenroleagree 
and Womenroledisagree are used to estimate the number of child a woman has, where the 
child variable is a dummy variable in the first stage. (Equation 27) 
3. The coefficient on the Womenroleagree instrument is much larger than that of the 
Womenroledisagree variable, and both are statistically significant.  
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Table 8: Two-Stage Least Squares by Region  
 Northeast North Central South West 
Numchildhh .3092    
(.3351) 
-.1631    
(.1100)*** 
-1.446    
(.3156)*** 
-.6820    
(.1310)*** 
Schoolyears .1194    
(.0115)*** 
.1298     
(.0090)*** 
.1362   
(.0129)*** 
.1048    
(.0131)*** 
Experience 0508    
(.0368) 
.0623    
(.0173)*** 
.1719    
(.0243)*** 
.1267    
(.0163)*** 
Experience2 -.0018    
(.0009)** 
-.0007    
(.0004)* 
-.0032   
(.0005)*** 
-.0022    
(.0004)*** 
Race -.1459    
(.0439)*** 
-.0061    
(.0380) 
-.2043    
(.0780)** 
-.2334    
(.0861)** 
Year .0579    
(.0118)*** 
.0496    
(.0064)*** 
.0475    
(.0076)*** 
.0513    
(.0087)*** 
Hispanic -.1654   
(.0864)* 
.2324      
(.0781)** 
-.0775    
(.1060) 
-.2731    
(.1429)* 
Race 0 
(Omitted) 
0 
(Omitted) 
0 
(Omitted) 
0 
(Omitted) 
Married .0883    
(.0230)*** 
.0532   
(.0154)*** 
.0233    
(.0160) 
-.0054      
(.0215) 
Childcarearrange .1027    
(.0195)*** 
.1541    
(.0211)*** 
.0266    
(.0193) 
.0881    
(.0213)*** 
Worksathome -.7858    
(.1203)*** 
-.7997   
(.1271)*** 
.4520    
(.2353)* 
-.2987    
(.1393)** 
Daycare .4319    
(.0885)*** 
.6820    
(.0861)*** 
.2796    
(.0843)*** 
.5937    
(.0899)*** 
School .4319    
(.0885) 
.2829    
(.0677)*** 
.4191    
(.0693)*** 
.4846    
(.0752)*** 
Careindifferenthome .3608    
(.0836)*** 
.3162   
(.0647)*** 
.2158     
(.0528)*** 
.3532    
(.0615)*** 
Homecarebyrelative -.1755    
(.0868)** 
-.0614    
(.0861) 
.1755    
(.0697)** 
.0219     
(.0808) 
Preschool/Nursery 0 
(Omitted) 
0 
(Omitted) 
0 
(Omitted) 
0 
(Omitted) 
Urban .0941   
(.0552)* 
.0109     
(.0352) 
.0503     
(.0313) 
.1225      
(.0552)** 
Constant -108.7892   
(23.1289)*** 
-92.5066   
(12.7034)*** 
-86.0074   
(14.6818) 
-94.2712   
(17.01375)**** 
F Statistic 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of 
Observations 
3,886 6,588 12,034 5,186 
R Squared 
 
0.1554 0.2528 -0.8700 0.0396 
Notes:  
1. * if significant at P<.10, ** if significant at P<.05, *** if significant at P<.01 
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2. Standard errors are in parenthesis 
3. This table shows a comparison of the second stage of 2SLS, where the first stage 
consisted of two instruments, Womenroleagree and Womenroledisagree. (Equation 15) 
4. The variable of interest is Numchildhh and the dependent variable is the Lnwage.  
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Table 9: Heckman Selection Model for Labor Force Participation by Region  
 Northeast North Central South West 
Numchildhh -.1609 
(.0198)*** 
-.0537    
(.0151)*** 
-.1270   
(.0115)*** 
-.0436 
(.0176)** 
Schoolyears .0245 
(.0112)*** 
.0243 
(.0099)** 
.0773 
(.0064)*** 
.0356     
(.0103)*** 
Experience .0592 
(.0163)*** 
.0029 
(.0143)** 
.0449 
(.0093)*** 
.0193     
(.0154) 
Experience2 -.0020 
(.0005)*** 
.0002 
(.0004) 
-.0005    
(.0003)* 
-.0005    
(.0004) 
Race -.2124 
(.0323)*** 
-.1443    
(.0312)*** 
.1060 
(.0186)*** 
.1065    
(.0434)** 
Year .0715 
(.0091)*** 
.0503 
(.0072)*** 
.0331 
(.0048)*** 
.0561    
(.0081)*** 
Hispanic -.0453 
(.0518) 
-.0089   
(.0591) 
.2149 
(.0286)*** 
.0901    
(.0772) 
Other 0 
(Omitted) 
0  
(Omitted) 
0  
(Omitted) 
0  
(Omitted) 
Married -.1036 
(.0211)*** 
-.0731    
(.0165)*** 
-.1057    
(.0108)*** 
-.0939    
(.0190)*** 
Childcarearrange .0770 
(.0132)*** 
.0841 
(.0146)*** 
.0441 
(.0081)*** 
.0913    
(.0152)*** 
Worksathome -.4988 
(.1168)*** 
-.4716   
(.1011)*** 
-.2261    
(.0659)*** 
-.5335    
(.0849)*** 
Daycare .2795 
(.0551)*** 
.4258    
(.0603)*** 
.2841 
(.0354)*** 
.4608    
(.0696)*** 
School .0889 
(.0561) 
.1412 
(.0526)** 
.1561    
(.0324)*** 
.2003   
(.0581)*** 
Careindifferenthome .2033 
(.0421)*** 
.2004 
(.0442)*** 
.1594 
(.0258)*** 
.1929    
(.0484)*** 
Homecarebyrelative -.1136 
(.0522)** 
-.0126    
(.0519) 
.0703    
(.0308)** 
-.1226    
(.0555)** 
Preschool/Nursery 0  
(Omitted) 
0  
(Omitted) 
0  
(Omitted) 
0  
(Omitted) 
Urban .0324 
(.0363) 
.0712 
(.0226)*** 
.0977    
(.0147)*** 
.1404    
(.0395)*** 
Constant -132.4384 
(17.8849)*** 
-90.5971   
(14.2142)*** 
-57.7871    
(9.4566)*** 
-102.894   
(15.9842)*** 
F Statistic 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of 
Observations 
6,830 10,699 18,843 8,724 
Wald Chi Squared 656.39 638.61 1613.41 558.73 
 
Notes:  
1. * if significant at P<.10, ** if significant at P<.05, *** if significant at P<.01 
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2. Standard errors are in parenthesis 
3. This table shows the coefficients for the Heckman Model for Labor Force Participation 
by regions in the US 
4. The Numchildhh is the variable of interest and Lnwage is the dependent variable.  
5. A variable concerning familial attitudes, Womenrole, is used as the exclusion parameter 
in the first stage. 
 
 
Figure 2:  
 
Note: This figure illustrates how Exp2 is concave across panels.  
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Figure 3: 
 
Note: This figure shows the average nominal wage over time for men and women, where men 
consistently earn more over time.  
 
Figure 4: 
 
Note: This figure shows that for all years excluding 1997, 1998, and 1999, that those in urban 
areas earn a higher average wage.  
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Figure 5:  
 
Note: This figure shoes that those in the Northeast consistently earn more over time.  
 
Figure 6: 
 
Note: This figure shows that those who have multiple children (greater than 5) have lower wages 
than those who don’t and that over time, as children grow older, wages increase.  
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Figure 7:  
 
Note: This figure shows that those who work at home and those who bring their child to work 
have lower average wages than the other forms of care 
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